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Abstract 
The aim of this article is to discuss the relationship between economic sociology and economic 
policies. In the last decades, economic sociology has made significant achievements in terms of 
theory and research, but that its influence on policies has remained weak. While this was inevita-
ble in earlier decades, when scholars had to concentrate most of their effort  on defining the role 
and contribution of economic sociology, it has since become a constraint for the institutionaliza-
tion and recognition of the discipline. The return to economic sociology, since the 1980s, has 
brought about important theoretical achievements, especially in the analysis of economic organi-
zation at the micro level in terms of social and cultural embeddedness. The role of social relations 
in contemporary economy has clearly emerged, but its implications for policies to promote eco-
nomic development have remained more latent so far. Although a weaker institutionalization 
and a poorer connection to policy-making certainly affect the political influence of economic soci-
ology in comparison to economics, the paper focuses on the research perspective. A shift of the 
research focus from the statics to the dynamics of economic organization could be useful. In this 
framework, particular attention is drawn to the study of local development and innovation 
through a closer relationship of economic sociology with comparative political economy. A sepa-
ration between these two approaches does not favor a full exploitation of the potential con-
tribution of economic sociology to policies. 
                                                 
*Paper prepared for the International Review of Sociology. A first version was presented at the International 
Conference on “Economic Sociology: Problems and Prospects,” University of Crete, Rethimno, Crete, 
September 8-10 2004.  
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The aim of this article is to discuss the relationship between economic sociology 
and economic policies. I would like to show that in the last decades economic sociology 
has made significant achievements in terms of theory and research, but that its influence 
on policies has remained weak. While this was inevitable in earlier decades, when schol-
ars had to concentrate most of their effort on defining the role and contribution of eco-
nomic sociology, it has since become a constraint for the institutionalization and recog-
nition of the discipline.  
Of course, one could ask why we should care about influencing policy. It could 
be argued that the main goal of the discipline should be to improve knowledge of eco-
nomic activities and processes from a sociological point of view. My answer is that a so-
cial science should care about its contribution to a reflexive reconstruction of society. As 
James Coleman wrote, "social science is not only a search for knowledge for the aesthetic 
pleasure of discovery or for the sake of knowing, but a search for knowledge for the re-
construction of society" (Coleman 1990, 651). 
I will begin by recalling that the classics, the founding fathers of economic soci-
ology, viewed their approach as clearly oriented towards finding solutions for the recon-
struction of a society increasingly destabilized by liberal capitalism. Analytical inten-
tions and political implications were strictly related. However, after the Second World 
War, a process of disciplinary specialization took place. There was a decline of the clas-
sical tradition and a loss of interest in economic policies. The latter were mainly dis-
cussed in the framework provided by mainstream economics. In the ensuing part of the 
paper, I will try to show that a revival of economic sociology, since the 1980s, has 
brought about important theoretical achievements, especially in the analysis of economic 
organization at the micro level in terms of social and cultural embeddedness. The role of 
social relations in contemporary economy has clearly emerged, but its implications for 
policies to promote economic development have remained more latent so far. In the final 
section, I discuss some factors that affected this outcome and point to possible remedies 
to strengthen the contribution of economic sociology to policy proposals. I am aware 
that a weaker institutionalization and a poorer connection to policy-making certainly 
affect the political influence of economic sociology in comparison to economics. How-
ever, this paper concentrates on the role of the research orientation. It suggests that a 
shift of the research focus from the statics to the dynamics of economic organization 
could strengthen the policy impact of economic sociology. From this perspective, par-
ticular attention is drawn to the study of local development and innovation through a 
closer relationship with comparative political economy. The separation between these 
two approaches prevents a full exploitation of the potential contribution of economic 
sociology to policies. 
 
1. The classics of economic sociology and the political reform of capitalism 
The founders of economic sociology did not oppose the market, but were con-
vinced that it should be properly regulated. It was mainly in Germany, with Max Weber 
and Werner Sombart, that economic sociology grew as an autonomous discipline. Both 
of them respected neoclassical economics. They took Menger's side in the methodologi-
cal debate (Methodenstreit), where he opposed the historicists. They believed that analyti-
cal economic theory had a legitimate right to exist, but did not assume its empirical va- 
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lidity. Weber repeatedly stated that economic behavior was actually influenced only 
very rarely by the motivations that neo-classical economics attributed to self-interested, 
atomistic actors. This is why he wanted to begin a theoretical study of the economy in its 
socio-cultural context. He aimed to develop a micro-foundation of economic behavior 
able not only to improve the understanding of capitalist development, but also to pro-
vide more sophisticated and effective policy tools than the laissez-faire kit of neo-classical 
economics.  
The worries about liberal capitalism expressed by Weber and Sombart were 
shared by other classics, such as Durkheim and Polanyi. For all of them the market 
works better when problems of fairness and trust are successfully dealt with, and this 
distinguishes the sociological view from neo-classical economics. 
Economic sociology is more interested in the problems of fairness in real mar-
kets, while economics focuses on problems of efficiency, taking it for granted that a fully 
competitive market will also resolve any problems of equity. If labor relations are par-
ticularly unbalanced, conflicts may emerge in bargaining relations, which risk endan-
gering productive activities; or alternatively, workers may become less committed to 
their tasks, lowering productivity. In these cases, the institutions representing the col-
lective interest of workers and introducing political regulation into the labor market, be-
come important. Moreover, state intervention to regulate working conditions and to re-
duce social inequalities brought about by the market are also necessary precisely to have 
more efficient markets.  
In addition, the real operation of the economy is highly dependent on trust. Indi-
viduals are not normally well-informed or fully capable of rational calculation, and not 
everyone can be considered equally trustworthy. The lack of perfect information, to-
gether with the risk of moral hazard, makes market exchanges problematic, even where 
they have been legitimized. In addition, markets are not always fully competitive. In real 
societies, therefore, the market works better insofar as there are institutions that generate 
and reproduce trust through personal interactions (for example, those tied to families, 
kinship relations, local communities, etc.) or in an impersonal way, through formal in-
stitutions (such as legal sanctions applied to people who violate contracts). Therefore, 
what Durkheim called “non-contractual conditions of the contract” are crucial for the 
tradition of economic sociology. 
These analytical intentions of economic sociology are well known, but it is worth 
noticing that they were strictly related to clear political implications. The classics were 
convinced that social and political regulation of the market was necessary; and this con-
viction was strengthened by the economic and social turmoil brought about by the Great 
Depression and the crisis of liberal capitalism, as is very clear in Polanyi's Great Trans-
formation.  
However, after the Second World War, this tradition of economic sociology as 
macro-sociology of capitalism, oriented towards its political reform, declined. The legacy 
of the classics became fragmented and economic sociology moved towards greater the-
matic and disciplinary specialization. New fields emerged, such as industrial and labor 
sociology, organizational studies and industrial relations. The original political orienta-
tions towards the reform of liberal capitalism dissolved as well.  
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Many factors contributed to the process of fragmentation and disciplinary spe-
cialization, but there are two reasons particularly worth mentioning. The first concerns 
the consequences of intense economic growth and social and political stabilization. In 
other words, many of the worries about the difficult relationship between the economy 
and society in liberal capitalism – on which the founders of economic sociology had fo-
cused their attention – seemed less important as a consequence of the “great transfor-
mation” of capitalism. This occurred particularly in the more developed countries, 
where Keynesian policies and “Fordist” forms of industrial organization became wide-
spread. 
The second reason involves the contemporary redefinition of the boundaries 
between economics and sociology. On the one hand, with the “Keynesian revolution”, 
economics offered new and effective instruments to interpret and guide this new and 
intense phase of economic growth. On the other hand, the institutionalization of sociol-
ogy pushed scholars towards fields that were less studied by economists, and encour-
aged a greater disciplinary specialization. The work of Talcott Parsons played a crucial 
role in the redefinition of the boundaries between economics and sociology. 
 Parsons (1937) criticized the atomistic individualism of neo-classical economics 
because of its assumption that individuals define their ends independently of their mu-
tual interaction. However, he proposed a definition of the boundaries between the two 
disciplines based on what he called “the analytical factor view". Economics must be con-
ceived as the analytical theory of a factor of action based on the rational pursuit of indi-
vidual interest, while sociology should be understood as an abstract analytical theory of 
another factor of action, one linked to “ultimate values”. While an important effect of 
this influential view was to favor the academic institutionalization of sociology in new 
fields not presided over by economics, at the same time it also meant that the interests of 
the sociological community shifted away from economic sociology and towards other 
themes. Policy implications were loose and indirect, but basically they implied interven-
tions that could favor the social acceptance of market economy, even through re-
distributive policies (as is clear in Parsons and Smelser 1956). Economic organization 
was seen as essentially shaped by market incentives, and thus left to mainstream eco-
nomics. 
Summing up, we could say that when the era of the classics came to a close, their 
commitment to a political reform of capitalism had been taken over by Keynesian eco-
nomics and Fordist re-organization, until the late 1960s. Sociology was oriented towards 
the problem of social integration, and distanced itself from the analysis of the economy 
and from economic policies (Granovetter 1990). 
 
2. The revival of economic sociology: theoretical achievements distant from policies 
As is known, since the 1980s there has been a return to economic sociology with 
the "new economic sociology", focusing mainly on the micro level. Two main factors 
have influenced this trend. First, there was a theoretical reaction to new economic neo-
institutionalist's attempts to analyze the growing variety of productive organization. In 
addition to market and hierarchy, a number of new hybrid forms were developing, 
based on the more or less formalized collaboration between firms (joint ventures, alli- 
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ances, co-operation agreements, etc.). Although transaction-costs theory tried to redefine 
the traditional economic theory of action by taking into account aspects such as 
"bounded rationality" and "opportunism" (Williamson 1975,1985), this approach still ex-
plains organizational choices in terms of the rational search for efficiency. Thus, it has 
not been able to provide a satisfactory explanation for economic action under conditions 
of insufficient information and uncertainty.  
In sociology, the development of neo-institutional economic theories triggered, in 
turn, new explanations of organizational variety that underlined the autonomous roles 
of social networks, cultural factors and power relations. This led to the second factor 
driving new economic sociology. In the 1970s and early 1980s, there was a growing dis-
satisfaction in sociology with Talcott Parsons’ theory of action, and the new economic 
sociology was particularly influenced by the criticisms developed by ethno-
methodology and phenomenology (DiMaggio 1994). Thus, it shares a theory of action 
that is more constructivist, more contingent and more open to direct social interactions.  
Different approaches converge in the new economic sociology. It may be worth 
mentioning some differences and similarities between the structuralist and the neo-
institutional approach. In the structuralist approach, the actor’s location in the structure 
of social relations is crucial for understanding his actions (Granovetter 1985). It defines a 
peculiar “social capital” that can be used in economic transactions to provide informa-
tion and trust (Coleman 1990). Important applications of the structural approach can be 
found in the study of labor markets, business groups and inter-firm relations, product 
differentiation and market competition, new high-tech activities, the stock market. 
In contrast, sociological neo-institutionalists take a different position, emphasiz-
ing the autonomous role played by cultural factors in motivating actors and shaping or-
ganization choice. A good example of the analytical consequences resulting from the 
neo-institutionalist approach is the work on “isomorphism” by Powell and Di Maggio 
(1991). In empirical research, this approach has stimulated numerous contributions, es-
pecially in sectors that are not affected by market competition, such as non-profit and 
cultural organizations, as well as financial institutions and large accounting firms. Flig-
stein’s work (1990) on the productive diversification of large American firms provided 
an interesting application.  
Despite these differences, both the structural approach and sociological neo-
institutionalism provide a view of the market as embedded in social structures, and try 
to explain the real action of economic actors in concrete markets. Both also share an ex-
planation of organizational diversity than cannot be reduced to the mere search for effi-
ciency by atomistic actors (individuals or firms). Under the same conditions of "asset 
specificity" - to use Williamson's language – different actors could rely to different de-
grees on the market, hierarchy or relational contracting, thus providing variable organ-
izational choices. In fact their choice is influenced by their social relations (or social 
capital as intended by Coleman) and by their cognitive and normative attitudes. In this 
way the new economic sociology reacted to the "imperialism" of economic analysis by 
providing alternative explanations for the variety of economic organization. As 
Granovetter (1990) pointed out, this is an important difference from the "old" economic 
sociology, which did not trespass on the traditional boundaries between economic and 
sociology.  
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On the whole, this has been a significant theoretical achievement, which was fa-
vored by interesting research, and is in turn orienting new research on economic organi-
zation. However, there is in an important potential for policy-making in the new eco-
nomic sociology that has not been fully exploited so far. While the shortcomings of 
mainstream economics, particularly in the micro-foundation of economic behavior, have 
been clearly shown, standard economic thought continues to greatly influence policies 
to promote economic development. The new economic sociology appears distant from 
policy debates. Engaged in reacting to the “economic imperialism” at the analytical 
level, it remains extremely weak in challenging the dominance of mainstream economics 
and economic neo-institutionalism over policies. Why is it so? 
 
3. How to strengthen the influence of economic sociology on policies 
Current economic policies may take the form of either laissez-faire measures or 
state-centered intervention. Both orientations, however, share the same attitude towards 
economic behavior. Economic action is about self-interested and socially isolated actors. 
Laissez-faire policies assume that in order to improve economic development, economic 
actors have to be freed from social bonds and political constraints. This is still the same 
old worry, since Adam Smith, that social relations and networks among economic actors 
would bring about collusion, and could result in the loss of efficiency. In contrast, since 
the “Keynesian revolution”, state-centered measures recognize that uncertainty, lack of 
information and trust may hinder economic activity. However, they usually provide 
policy solutions that are based on two main instruments: financial incentives to compen-
sate the risks and costs coming from the backwardness of local settings, or public in-
vestments to improve infrastructure or human capital. In any case the role of social rela-
tions and social networks is not considered as a possible target for policies. On the con-
trary, it is often perceived as a factor that could hinder the efficient operation of markets. 
The reasons for the hegemony of mainstream economics over economic policies 
are complex. Certainly, economics provides important tools for the macro-management 
of contemporary economies, and this adds to a long-lasting tradition of institutionaliza-
tion. and reputation. Economic research centers - both within the university system and 
in public or non-governmental structures - are well entrenched and tightly connected to 
governmental decision-making. They have a long experience in translating economic 
ideas into policy proposals. It is obvious that the degree of institutionalization of eco-
nomic sociology and its capacity to influence policy proposals are much weaker.  
In addition, one should take into account that the policies shaped by mainstream 
economics tend to be more easily understood by politicians and representative of inter-
est groups, although this does not mean that they are always accepted. As a matter of 
fact, they are usually formulated in terms of attempts at influencing the behavior of sin-
gle actors, through financial incentives or regulatory measures. Policies inspired by eco-
nomic sociology would be more complex because they would try to shape the relational 
aspects of economic activities, or the building up of social capital as a way of fostering 
economic development. The benefits of such policies tend to be more diffuse, rather than 
concentrated on specific groups, and their effective implementation usually requires a 
longer time than standard economic measures.  
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Therefore, there are various reasons that hinder a stronger influence of economic 
sociology over policies. However, in the following remarks I will concentrate on some 
aspects that mainly concern the research topics and the analytical perspective of the dis-
cipline. Although these factors do not directly affect the important issues of institution-
alization and connection to the decision-making, my contention is that a shift of the re-
search focus to the problem of local development and innovation, and to the relevant 
policies, could improve the contribution of economic sociology to more effective poli-
cies. This, in turn, would require a more intense collaboration with comparative political 
economy. 
So far the “new economic sociology” - especially in the United States - has grown 
mainly dealing with static problems. Basically, it has tried to provide an alternative ex-
planation for the varieties of economic organization at the micro level. Research interests 
have been strongly concentrated on the attempt to show that efficiency reasons are not 
sufficient and can be misleading. Both the structural approach based on networks and 
the study of isomorphism undertaken by sociological neo-institutionalism reacted to 
economic explanations of economic organization. While this research focus was able to 
show the role of social and cultural factors in the operation of the economy, it was less 
favorable to exploiting the analytical potential of economic sociology in terms of poli-
cies. A shift of focus towards dynamic problems – such as local development and inno-
vation – could foster a more active contribution to policies New research might involve 
dynamic cities, backward areas that experience new growth, or local innovation systems 
such as new high tech districts. A systematic assessment of comparable cases of success 
and failure would allow a better understanding of the influence of social and cultural 
embeddedness on economic performance. 
  What are the policy implications of the social and cultural embeddedness of 
economic organization? We could hypothesize that the local availability of a rich net-
work of social relations would favor economic activity and development. It might help 
to tackle the problems of co-operation that are due to lack of information and trust; and 
it might also help to develop favorable relations among the leaders of collective actors, 
thus improving the provision of collective goods. If these hypotheses were reasonably 
confirmed, we would have important elements for new policies that go beyond the old 
dichotomy between state and market, by promoting cooperation among individual ac-
tors (firms, workers and firms) and collective actors (local governments and organized 
interests) as a way to support economic development and social quality. This could en-
tail both technical assistance and financial incentives to cooperative projects aimed at 
strengthening external economies and collective goods. 
To make progress in this direction would require more collaboration with com-
parative political economy in focusing on the role of politics and policies. The themes of 
local development and innovation have been more extensively investigated within the 
comparative political economy tradition, especially in the literature related to industrial 
districts and local innovation systems (Trigilia 2002), but also in work on the “varieties 
of capitalism” (Hall and Soskice 2002). However, the social dimension is often the miss-
ing link. A closer relationship with the theoretical framework and research tools of eco-
nomic sociology could improve the analysis of local development and innovation by fo-
cusing on the specific role of social networks and on their relationship with governance, 
and could also help to propose new and more effective policies.   
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From this perspective, I would like to draw attention to two problems. The first 
has to do with the specific role of social networks, which is not sufficiently clear in the 
political economy literature. They may favor development, or may hinder the growth of 
economic activities. They may lead to collusion, or to closure with regard to external 
stimuli (new knowledge of technology or market trends). So we must ask under what 
conditions social networks favor local economic development and innovation. The sec-
ond problem concerns the origins of “good” networks conducive to local development 
and innovation. It is important to clarify whether good social capital is just rooted in the 
history of a particular region or city, or can be fostered through appropriate political 
measures. The possibility of improving policies for local development and innovation 
strongly relies on adequate evidence and convincing comparative accounts. But before 
dealing with these problems (in the final section), it is worth pointing to the increased 
importance of social relations in contemporary economic organization. 
 
4. Why social relations become more important for economic development 
Comparative political economy implicitly suggests that social networks are more 
important for economic development, in the post-Fordist era: the economy tend to be-
come more “relational” (Veltz 2000, DiMaggio 2002). Fordist organization made social 
networks less important than in liberal capitalism. Large vertically-integrated firms were 
more autonomous from their environment. The non-economic factors that most influ-
enced development were mainly of two types: the organizational capacity of the firm – 
the “visible hand” of the organization at the micro-level - and the Keynesian policies at 
the macro-level. Policies to attract large external firms by means of incentives and infra-
structures were also important for backward areas. Stability was the key word for the 
old model, which guided the “golden age” of post-war development. In the last decades 
it has been increasingly substituted by two other catch-words, especially for firms in ad-
vanced countries: flexibility and quality. Flexible specialization changed the landscape 
and tended to give social networks a growing role. The search for flexibility and quality 
led not only to restructuring to increase the autonomy of the firms’ internal organiza-
tion, but even more to a greater need for external co-operation, especially in sectors 
where the technological trajectory is uncertain or the demand is very unstable (as in 
biotechnologies, or in the media industry or in some parts of ICT).  
Networks of firms (or districts) and large networked-firms become the protago-
nists of contemporary economy. But they are more dependent than their predecessor of 
the past – the vertically-integrated large firm - on the willingness of the workers and 
other firms to cooperate effectively to obtain flexibility and quality. This increased the 
potential transaction costs and therefore the value of social capital – of the networks of 
social relations rooted in a certain territory – in the productive process and for innova-
tion. However, one could object that increasing globalization of economic activities, and 
the improvement in communications, foster a decentralization of manufacturing to-
wards the newly developing countries with lower costs. Thus, the role of localized social 
networks tends to become less important in a global market where contractual relations 
are continuously growing.  
As a matter of fact, individual firms – above all the multinationals, but also the 
smaller firms – can search, more easily now than in the past, for more advantageous  
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conditions by moving from one country to another and by combining in their productive 
process inputs from firms and local partners in different areas, through complex organ-
ized structures. The improvement of communications and information technologies help 
this process. All this tends to rapidly alter the localized benefits of a particular territory. 
Nevertheless, the empirical evidence suggests that the result is not a simple tendency 
towards the “de-territorialization” of productive processes, but rather a greater compe-
tition between regions in which the resource of “good” social networks between indi-
vidual and collective actors is crucial. Productive growth and localization of external in-
vestments tend in fact to concentrate where the external economies and productive spe-
cialization are stronger. This affects both the newly developing countries as well as the 
more advanced ones.  
The decentralization of manufacturing to areas with lower costs is not even. It is 
much stronger in areas where external economies and collective goods are more wide-
spread. The availability of “good” social networks among individual firms, and among 
employers and workers influence the potential for economic development. No less im-
portant is the role of collective social capital: cooperative and effective relations among 
private and public actors which help to increase the production of collective goods (in-
frastructure, services, training) for the local economy (Evans 1996). Even within the “de-
velopmental states”, in the Third World, there are strong regional differences in the 
ability to attract foreign investments and to sustain local initiatives. 
In the developed countries, globalization is fueling an overall reshuffling of eco-
nomic organization. While manufacturing tends to shrink, there is a shift toward the 
new knowledge economy. These countries are forced to pursue a “high road” based on 
innovation in high-tech activities more dependent on scientific advances. But this trend 
is producing a new “re-territorialization” of the economy around specialized areas and 
cities, both in Europe (Crouch et al. 2001, 2004) and in the US (Florida 2002,2005). Inno-
vation is now more closely tied to processes of co-operation among firms in different 
sectors, which imply the sharing of a language, the development of “conversations” 
among different actors (Lester and Piore 2004); some forms of tacit knowledge that allow 
the better exploitation of standard technologies and codified knowledge to find out new 
solutions and new products. Paradoxically enough, in many innovative sectors such us 
bio-technologies, software activities or the media industry, the growth of new informa-
tion and communication technologies increases the diffusion of codified information, 
but at the same time opens up a greater role for tacit knowledge and understanding, 
embedded in social networks, as a competitive resource. Again, it is not only the net-
work of relations between individuals, but that between organizations, or collective ac-
tors, which is also important. A good network of relations between interest organiza-
tions, financial institutions, universities, and local governments can favor the improve-
ment of infrastructural facilities and the efficient provision of economic and social ser-
vices, as well as the influx of capital and investments of both local and external firms, 
and the establishment of effective cooperation among economic actors and research and 
training institutions. 
Therefore, it can be said that globalization has contradictory consequences for lo-
cal development. It may weaken some areas not only as a result of higher costs, but also 
because these do not manage to keep up with the provision of external economies and 
collective goods that are necessary to increase productivity. It may however favor other  
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areas that exploit their social capital to attract external firms and to take advantage of the 
greater opportunities in terms of a growing market for exports that open up, as in the 
developing countries; or to exploit the new possibilities dependent on knowledge-based 
economy for developing more innovative activities, as in advanced countries. 
 On the whole, it is to be stressed that the importance of social network seems to 
increase, in comparison to the past. This trend enhances the possibilities of local actors to 
affect the development of their region. This process does not necessarily depend on 
lower costs, although they remain important as competitive resource, especially in the 
developing countries. Both in the backward and in the advanced countries, the capacity 
to use social capital to develop a certain amount of knowledge and of specialization is a 
key resource for development. 
 
5. Social networks, local development and policies 
While the political economy literature suggests that social networks may play an 
important role in local development, it is not sufficiently clear how they actually work, 
under what conditions they may favor economic development, and when they instead 
lead to collusion or closure to external knowledge. Another crucial problem concerns the 
possibility of promoting cooperative social networks that are conducive to economic de-
velopment and innovation through intentional actions. A research investment by eco-
nomic sociology in these issues, and a closer cooperation with comparative political 
economy, could improve the understanding of these processes and could help develop 
new policies more fine-tuned to the relational features of contemporary economy. 
Some examples can help to clarify these problems. Let us consider first the prob-
lem of collusion with particular reference to the backward areas. The role of traditional 
social structures (e.g. family, kinship, community, religious, ethnic subcultures), as re-
sources for development in backward countries has been widely discussed, reversing 
one of the classic assumptions of the theory of modernization. In fact, however, their re-
lationship with economic development is more complex. While traditional resources as 
source of social networks are widespread, their activation as resources for development 
is quite uneven, as is shown, for instance, by a comparison between Latin-American and 
Asian countries. What makes the difference seems the combination of networks based 
on traditional institutions and a modernized politics, autonomous from civil society. It is 
the “embedded autonomy” (Evans 1995) – the autonomy of political action that is at the 
same time socially embedded at the local level – which can contribute in an innovative 
way to local development. In Latin America politics seems to have hindered the pro-
ductive use of social capital linked to traditional structures, because of its lack of auton-
omy from social interests and the weakness of state structures. On the contrary, the 
Asian experiences show a polity that not only provided more strategic capabilities (de-
velopmental states), but also oriented social networks towards the economic rather than 
the political market.  
 Following this perspective, one can propose the hypothesis that the composition 
of social capital (strong ties vs. weak ties) matters. It seems likely that an appropriate 
mix of the two types would favor economic growth. But an important condition has to 
do with the role of politics. Political settings that are more autonomous from particular- 
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istic pressure seem more able to avoid the collusive use of social networks, more ori-
ented to the political rather then to the economic market. In addition, this kind of polity 
seems more equipped to avoid the closure of local networks to external stimuli, and 
therefore more able to prevent the emergence of lock-ins. More systematic comparative 
studies could throw light on this crucial issue, which is obviously important for policies. 
Another example that shows the importance of clarifying the role of social net-
works concerns the sites of innovation in the most advanced countries. There is a clear 
link between the production of innovation in the knowledge-based economy and the 
cities. Richard Florida (2005) pointed out that the process is mainly influenced by some 
social groups with high human capital. They choose to live in cities with high degree of 
tolerance, and cultural and social amenities. This, in turn, attracts – or contributes to the 
creation of – innovative firms. This explanation raises many questions about the causal 
direction. However, it is certainly true that not all the large and well-equipped cities are 
able to trigger a virtuous circle between people and innovative activities, including the 
crucial contribution of university and research institutions. There is a different “absorp-
tive” capacity of potential for innovation related to universities and research facilities, in 
terms of economic, cultural and social infrastructure. The comparison between Silicon 
Valley and route 128 in Boston (Saxenian 1994) suggests that there is an important social 
factor in the explanation of why certain regions or cities succeed and others do not. 
Again, a closer attention in comparative terms to the role of social networks and to their 
relations to governance could help to better understand local development, and could 
contribute to work out more effective policies beyond the traditional opposition between 
market and state-centered policies. 
Let us come to a second problem. It is not yet clear whether the role of social 
networks is merely dependent on the history of local contexts - on the way history has 
shaped culture and social relations of actors - or if it may also be socially and politically 
constructed through reflexive action. In the first case, if path-dependency prevails, there 
is little space for policies. Local development could be predicted but hardly promoted 
through purposive policies in local contexts which lack certain requisites. In the other 
case, we could learn important lessons for new policies that work by promoting the ap-
propriate social capital through financial incentives and technical assistance. These kind 
of policies that try to foster economic development by promoting social capital are 
growing, especially in Europe, where they are pursued by the EU, and in the developing 
countries through programs of international organization such as the World Bank or 
UNIDO, and others. Therefore, it would be crucial to select and investigate cases of local 
development that are based on planned interventions to improve cooperation among 
individual actors, as well as collective actors. These might include cases of strategic 
planning for cities, territorial pacts for backward areas, or projects for the growth of high 
tech systems. Such an analysis might encourage the creation of a new repertoire of poli-
cies for economic development that build social bridges between state and market, and 
take more into account the relational bases of contemporary economic organization.  
These examples show that there could be an important role for economic sociol-
ogy in the analysis of local development and innovation. This, in turn, could strengthen 
the contribution of this approach to more effective policies. But this also requires that 
economic sociologists start to pay more attention to political processes and the role of 
public policies than the new economic sociology has so far. As Fligstein (2002)  has  
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pointed out, this would be important because it would not only contribute to a more in-
tegrated sociology of markets, but would also help to link micro-economic sociology 
with macro-comparative political economy (see also Block and Evans 2005).  
Actually, in the main accounts of more recent achievements, economic sociology 
has been mainly identified with the "new economic sociology" developed in the US. This 
trend does not favor a closer relationship with comparative political economy. A wider 
conception of economic sociology that includes comparative political economy would be 
consistent with the classical tradition of economic sociology, which paid particular at-
tention to the influence of the state on economic activities (Trigilia 2002). It also would 
help to develop the policy implications of theoretical and empirical achievements. In this 
way economic sociology could integrate its theoretical framework with the kind of "plu-
ralistic applied research" that Coleman was demanding, for a richer contribution to the 
reflexive reconstruction of society. 
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